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Abstract
As Traditional Defined Benefit (DB) plans are declining, more companies are switching to
Defined Contribution (DC) plans. However, DC plans have significant disadvantages since
employees bear all investment and longevity risk. Hybrid pension plans, lying between DB
and DC plans, are designed to meet the needs of both contributors and beneficiaries with
better ways of sharing the risks. In this paper, based on the mathematical results from
intergenerational risk sharing plans (Hardy et al. (2020)), we design a new profit sharing
hybrid pension plan. We compare the solvency, contributions, and benefits between the
new hybrid plan with the traditional DB plan. We find that the new hybrid design can
better manage the volatility of contributions, and it can offer a guaranteed base income
that isn’t provided in the traditional DB plan if considering the risk of default. The new
hybrid plan also offers some flexibility to balance the preference between benefit security
and potential for higher income.
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor Professor Mary Hardy.
Back in February 2020, I didn’t have a special interest to support my research focus. It was
Professor Mary Hardy who built my knowledge and shared her insights about the meaning
of the Pension field. Based on that, I know that I am not only completing my thesis for
graduation, but I hope my research can help the whole society be better off.
I would like to acknowledge Sijia Li, who has worked together with me for the past
eight months. I gained more than I expected by listening to each other’s ideas and sharing
our insights.
Finally, I would like to express my special thanks to my parents and friends for their
love, prayers, and caring.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Figures vii
List of Tables ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Model Development 5
2.1 Notation and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Input Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Projection of Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 Projection of Accrued Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Projection of Liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3 Valuation Projection Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Projection of Assets and Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Projection method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 Asset/Liability rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.2 Total Contribution Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
v
3 A Hybrid Pension Plan 16
3.1 Basis Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 The Profit Sharing Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Hybrid Plan Results 24
4.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1 Asset-Liability ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.2 Total Contribution Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.3 Real income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2 Sensitivity Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.1 Changing the Accrual Rate and the Equity Weighting . . . . . . . . 35






1.1 Participation in Retirement plans; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Pop-
ulation Survey, and U.S. Department of Labor data. From Rauh et al. (2020) 2
2.1 Traditional DB Asset/Liability rate; investing 60% in equities. 1000 projec-
tions, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with 30 sample paths . . . . . . 12
2.2 Traditional DB Asset/Liability rate; investing 70% in equities. 1000 projec-
tions, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with 30 sample paths . . . . . . 12
2.3 Traditional DB plan results. A/L rates including additional contributions.
1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30
sample paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Traditional DB plan results. Total Contribution rates including additional
contributions(employers and active members each pay 50%). 60% in equi-
ties. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same
30 sample paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 Hybrid Plan Basis Account results: Asset/Liability rate. 1000 projections,
5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths as in
Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Hybrid Plan Basis Account results: Total Contribution rate. 1000 projec-
tions, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
as in Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3 Hybrid Plan Basis Account (solid) vs Traditional DB plan (dotted line):
Total contribution rates. Same accrual rates. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%,
50%, 75%, 95% quantiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
vii
3.4 Hybrid Plan Profit Sharing Account results: Asset/Liability rates. 1000
projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample
paths as in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5 Hybrid Plan Profit Sharing Account results: Total Contribution rates (a) no
constraint, and (b) with constraint of 0% minimum contribution rates. 1000
projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample
paths as in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 Hybrid Plan: Asset-Liability rate results. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Traditional DB plan: Asset-Liability rate results. 1000 projections, 5%,
25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths . . . . . . . 26
4.3 A/L rates: Traditional DB plan, Basis Account, Profit Sharing Account,
and hybrid plan. Same Economic Scenarios in each graph . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4 Total Contribution rate - Hybrid plan results. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%,
50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.5 Total Contribution rate comparison Between Hybrid Plan and Traditional
DB Plan. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles . . . . . . . 30
4.6 Total Contribution rates: Traditional DB plan, Hybrid plan. Same Eco-
nomic Scenarios in Figure 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.7 Projected real income for an active member age 45 at the start of the pro-
jections; Comparison between 4.7(a)Hybrid plan and 4.7(b)Traditional DB
plan; same 100 paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.8 Hybrid Plan: Replacement Ratio at age 65 over 5-year Final Average Salary
at age 64. 1000 simulation projections. The red line indicates the replace-
ment rate of Traditional DB plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
viii
List of Tables
4.1 Sensitivity Test: impact on solvency, contributions and benefits of Tradi-
tional DB plan, Hybrid plan 1: increasing BA’s equity weight, and Hybrid
plan 2: adjusting α and increasing BA’s equity weight. 1000 projections . 36
4.2 Sensitivity Testing: Impact on solvency, contributions, and benefits by
changing amount of pension deduction and contribution rate in the PS and
A/L rate threshold of paying. 1000 projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.1 Membership information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44




Traditional Defined Benefit (DB) plans are apparently declining all around the world.
Many employers switched from DB plans to Defined Contribution (DC) plans, letting
employees bear the risk of uncertain pensions. In the 1980s, of all private-sector wage and
salary workers participating in a pension plan, 60% were in a DB plan, 17% only in a DC
plan, and the remaining 23% were participating in both types of plans. By 2018, of those
participating in a plan, merely 2% were solely in a DB plan, 80% were solely in a DC plan,
and the remaining 18% were in both, (Rauh et al., 2020).
Fewer and fewer employers choose to provide DB pensions since they prefer not to take
the risk of higher costs. Rauh et al. (2020) show that, even though theoretically employers
can hedge the interest rate risk, mortality risk, and investment risk by asset liability match-
ing, it’s hard to achieve in practice since suitable hedging instruments are not generally
available.
However, there is an awareness that DC plans do not adequately meet the needs of
retirees. From Cooper (2014)’s conclusions, one of the common flaws of DC plans would
be excessive volatility of funds, which Cooper deems as “not fit for purpose”. Plan mem-
bers may experience significantly inadequate retirement incomes under unfavorable market
conditions. Furthermore, few plan members have the sophisticated financial knowledge to
manage their DC assets through retirement.
Since neither DC nor DB plans can fulfill the needs of both employers and employees, it’s
necessary to design new retirement benefit plans with better structures. Several different
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Figure 1.1: Participation in Retirement plans; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Popu-
lation Survey, and U.S. Department of Labor data. From Rauh et al. (2020)
types of hybrid pension plans have been studied. One of them would be Hybrid DB-DC
plans. Ponds and Riel (2007) studied them from an ALM framework. They concluded
that hybrid plans can effectively minimize the risk of under-funding since the solvency risk
can be controlled by two steering mechanisms.
Blommestein et al. (2009) compared different hybrid pension plans and evaluated their
risk-sharing characteristics. Funding ratios and replacement rates were two of their key
criteria. By running stochastic simulations, they concluded that the hybrid plans can be
efficient and sustainable through risk-sharing. In their paper, hybrid plans are defined as
plans lying between traditional DB and individual DC plans, but the plans studied are
similar to DC plans. In this paper, we use similar, but more structured, criteria, and we
study hybrid plans that are close to the traditional DB plan, since it has a more favorable
payment structure from the members’ perspective.
Zhu et al. (2018) studied the DB Underpin option, which provides a DC plan with a
guaranteed minimum benefit based on a traditional DB formula. Zhu et al. (2018) consid-
ered this plan from sponsor’s perspective. The study formulated the problem and presented
some theoretical results, followed by some numerical results. In addition to specified con-
tributions into the member’s DC account, plan sponsors need to contribute more for the
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cost of the guarantee. Compared to a pure DB plan, the DB underpin shifts more risk and
cost to the employer, so it might not be an attractive option for pension sponsors.
Hardy et al. (2020) studied Intergenerational Risk Sharing (IRS) plans, which are risk
sharing, target income plans. Unlike a traditional DB plan, both workers and retirees share
deficits and surpluses. When the deficit is over a set threshold, both benefits and contribu-
tions are adjusted, instead of only contributions in the traditional DB plan. It can offer a
more stable income when aggregating both pre- and post- retirement periods. It’s a simple
and transparent design, with advantages for both contributors and beneficiaries. However,
considering the fairness of the pension design, the IRS is more beneficial for younger lives
at entry rather than the older.
A new hybrid pension design will be introduced in this paper based on previous research.
The new hybrid pension is structured as a guaranteed traditional DB plan with an IRS
plan top up. Compared with a pure IRS plan, the new hybrid plan provides a guaranteed
pension benefit floor, with additional variable pension payments from the IRS plan, with
deficits and surpluses shared by both workers and retirees. We use Monte Carlo simulations
to evaluate solvency, contributions, and benefits from both contributor’s and beneficiary’s
perspectives.
We evaluate the pension plan using the key criteria from Hardy et al. (2020):
• Sustainability: A sustainable plan would have the risk of high costs under a con-
trollable manner even under unfavorable economic conditions. A plan would not be
sustainable if the cost of the plan is too volatile.
• Affordability: If a plan is affordable, the average total contribution rate would be
acceptable for both employers and active members.
• Adequacy: A plan provides adequate pensions if an employee can receive sufficient
amount of retirement income to make a living through their retirement.
• Efficiency: A plan would be inefficient if it either carried too much surplus or paid
more than adequate pensions, i.e. collecting too much in contribution.
• Fairness: We evaluate the fairness of the plan by considering the costs and benefits
for different generations.
3
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a model
traditional DB pension system, including model set up and analysis of results. Chapter 3
develops the new hybrid pension plan, with some testing results. Chapter 4 compares the
new hybrid plan and the traditional DB plan, as well as reporting on sensitivity testings




A model pension system contains (1) a demographic model (2) a benefit structure to be
paid (3) an asset strategy and model and (4) a funding strategy and model. A pension
model is developed as an analytical tool so that more integrated decisions can be made by
analyzing the relationship between the assets and the liabilities of the plan, the contribu-
tion rates of the plan members, and the real income of the members.
The model can be constructed in three sectors:
• Projection of Plan Benefit;
• Projection of Liability and Contributions;
• Projection of Assets and Returns.
A brief description of each sector will be provided below.
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
We use a time horizon of 30 years in our model. We assume that our members enter the
plan between age 25 and 55, and retire at age 65. The maximum age is 105. A lump sum,
equal to the actuarial value at exit of the deferred pension, is paid if death or withdrawal
happens before retirement age.
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2.1.1 Input Data
L(x, 0): number of members at age x at time 0, x = 25, 26, ..., 105;
NE(x): number of new entrants at age x, x ≤ 64;
ny(x, 0): average years of services of members age x at time 0, x ≤ 64;
S(x, 0): average salary at age x at time 0, x ≤ 64;
b(x, 0): benefit in payment for 65 ≤ x ≤ 105;
p
(τ)
x : probability that (x) is in service at age x+ 1, x ≤ 64;
px: probability that (x) survives at age x+ 1, x > 65;
α: accrual rate.
2.1.2 Assumptions
We generated annual time series for equity prices, long term bonds, and inflation from
Wilkie (1984), fitted to US 1951-2014 date. We use parameters from Zhang et al. (2018).
We slightly adjusted the generated time series for the following data and assumptions:
• Asset returns: we define ye(t) as return on equities in year t− 1 to t and yb(t) as
return on 20 year long-term bonds based on the Yield to Maturity (YTM) in year t
to t+ 1, generated from Wilkie ESG;
• Inflation rates: The experienced inflation rates, js(t), are generated from the Wilkie
model;
• Salary growth rate: We assume the salary growth rates, gs(t), are 50bp higher
than the inflation rate js(t).
2.2 Projection of Demographics
To project the demographics, we need to consider plan membership, average salary, and
accrued benefit. We define L(x, t) as the number of members age x at time t. We assume
all members at age 25 are new entrants. At each year end, the number of members is
adjusted by the decrement rate with new entrants added:
L(25, t) = NE(25);
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L(x, t) = L(x− 1, t− 1) · p(τ)x−1 +NE(x) for x = 26, 27, .., 65
for x > 66 , L(x, t) = L(x− 1, t− 1) · px−1 since members retire at age 65.
We then calculate the average years of service of member age x at time t. Every member
already in the plan receives one more year of service in each year, and the new entrants at
time t will receive a half year of service:
ny(x, t) =




Our next step is to project average salaries. Define S(x, t) as the average salary at age
x at time t, then
S(x, t) = S(x, t− 1) · (1 + gs(t)).
This implies that S(x, 0) acts as a promotional age-based salary scale.
2.2.1 Projection of Accrued Benefits
Benefits are based on a 5-year averaging Final Average Salary:
FAS(x, t) =
∑5
i=1(S(max(25, x− i),max(0, t− i)) · (1 + gs(0))min(t−i,0)
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We define b(x, t) as the average accrued benefit for age x at time t. Note that for retired
members from age 66, the accrued benefit is adjusted annually for cost of living adjustment
(COLA):
b(x, t) = α · ny(x, t) · FAS(x, t) for x ≤ 65
b(x, t) = b(x− 1, t− 1) · (1 + js(t)) for x > 66
The total current accrued benefit for active members age x at time t is:
B(x, t) = b(x, t) · L(x, t)






2.2.2 Projection of Liabilities
This sector performs an actuarial valuation on each future year’s plan membership in order
to determine the liabilities and annual contributions. We use assumptions and methods
that are similar to those used in practice.
• Actuarial assumptions: these include decrement assumptions, which are the same
as we used in projecting accrued benefits.
• Economic assumptions:
Valuation interest rate i(t): generated from the YTM on long-term risk free bonds,
with a 3-year moving average. Typically, actuaries use YTM on corporate bonds for
setting the valuation interest rate, so we assume there is a basis point spread be-
tween corporate bonds and risk free. 80 basis points are added by setting the average
interest rate equal to the average return over time and scenarios, assuming a 60/40
investment split;
Valuation inflation rate j(t): used when calculating the actuarial liability. We
assume j(t) is changed at the same level of valuation interest rate i(t) at each time,
so at time t, we have: j(t) = min(3%,max(0%, i(t) − 0.0255)).
Valuation salary growth rate g(t): 200bp below the interest rate i(t). Our salary
growth rate only includes the outside effect of inflation but not inside effect such as
promotions. Note that the promotional salary increase has been performed from our
input data S(x, 0).
• Valuation Method: Traditional Unit Credit (TUC) method;
• Normal Cost method: The method used to recognize pension costs for active
members to afford service in the current year indicated by TUC methods.
2.2.3 Valuation Projection Method
We define V (x, t) as the actuarial liability for plan members age x at time t, under the
TUC valuation method. For active members with age below 65,
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V (x, t) = B(x, t) ·65−x p(τ)x · v65−xi(t) · ar(65, t)
where ar(65, t) =
40∑
k=0
kp65 · vki(t) · (1 + j(t))k, which is the actuarial value of benefit annuity
at time t for members retiring at age 65.
For retirees, V (x, t) = B(x, t) · ar(x, t), x > 65;








Our liability projection at time t is V T (t) = V TIF (t) + V TIP (t)
The Normal Cost for employees age x at time t:
NC(x, t) = ((1 + g(t)) · FAS(x+ 1, t)
FAS(x, t)
· ny(x, t) + 1
ny(x, t)
− 1) · V T (x, t)








We assume 50% of the costs will be shared by employers 50% and the rest will be paid
by active members.
2.3 Projection of Assets and Returns
The plan is assumed to be fully funded on the TUC valuation at the start of the projection.
The assets are assumed to be invested in a mix of equities and long-term risk free bonds,
rebalanced to maintain the proportions at each year end. For the benchmark results, we




The starting assets Abf(0) would be a proportion k of our current liability. At this mo-
ment, we assume that the benefits are fully funded so that Abf(0) = k × V T (0), k = 1.
Immediately after the valuation at t = 0, we receive the contribution and pay benefits:
A(0) = Abf(0) +NCSUM(0) −BSUM(0)
Withdrawal Benefit
In our plan, we assume all members can take a lump-sum distribution from the plan
without paying a penalty for all kinds of early withdrawal including death. We need to
deduct the withdrawal benefits from our asset.
We first determine the number of lives withdrawing at age x in year t−1 to t, LW (x, t):
LW (x, t) = L(x, t) × (1 − p(τ)x ).
We then define WB(x, t) as withdrawal benefit of members age x withdrawing at time
t, so
WB(x, t) = α · (ny(x, t) + 1
2
) · FAS(x, t) · v65−(x+ 12 ) · a(65)




WB(x, t) · LW (x, t)
New Entrants Contributions
We assume a new entrant age x who enters the plan at time t pays a half previous




NE(x) · NC(x− 1, t− 1)




We assume that we only put our assets in two kinds of investments: equities and long
term bonds. The accumulated return rate at time t is
R(t) = w · (1 + ye(t)) + (1 − w) · (1 + yb(t))
where w is the proportion of assets invested in equities.
Let Abf(t) denote the assets brought forward at time t before paying benefits and
receiving contributions:
Abf(t) = A(t− 1) ·R(t) −WSUM(t) ·R(t) 12 +NCNE(t) ·R(t) 12 .
At time t, we receive the Normal Contribution and pay the benefits. Both Normal
Contributions NCSUM(t) and Benefits BSUM(t) are assumed to be paid at the start
of the year. Then the value of assets at time t, after receiving Normal Contribution and
paying benefits, is
A(t) = Abf(t) −BSUM(t) +NCSUM(t)
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Asset/Liability rate
To analyze the model, we first show the Asset-Liability ratio (A/L): AL(t) = Abf(t)/V T (t)
at each time. We construct a matrix of A/L ratios for each projection, for each of the 1000
individual paths, and plot 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% quantiles for the metrics at each
year end. In addition, we plot 30 random individual paths. These are shown in Figure 2.1.
In Figure 2.1, we can see all the quantiles except 95% are declining as time goes on.
The median at all times is below 1.0 and drops to about 0.75 to the end; the worst 5%
cases decline to 0 at the end. This indicates that the Normal Contribution is not sufficient
to fund the liability.
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Figure 2.1: Traditional DB Asset/Liability rate; investing 60% in equities. 1000 projec-
tions, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with 30 sample paths
Figure 2.2: Traditional DB Asset/Liability rate; investing 70% in equities. 1000 projec-
tions, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with 30 sample paths
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To fix the problem of deficit, we can either increase the contributions or increase the
asset returns. We first try to see if changing the weight on equities solves the issue. Instead
of investing 60% of our assets in equities, we invest 70% in equities and 30% in long-term
bonds. From Figure 2.2, we can see that investing more in equities stretches out the quan-
tiles plot. The 95% quantile increases to about 1.75. The 5% quantile becomes negative
after 25 years, indicating that the plan has run out assets. The individual paths become
more volatile. The highest A/L in the paths shown is more than 2.5. However, all the
percentiles except 95% are still declining, which means that changing the weights is not
able to solve the problem.
In practice additional contributions would make up the deficit. We assume the addi-
tional contribution is 10% of any deficit in each year. That represents approximately a
10-year window to recover from deficit. Also if the TUC A/L ratio is greater than 1.2, 20%
of the surplus is released as a contribution reduction to avoid gathering too many assets,
with a minimum contribution of 0%.
In Figure 2.3, We plot the key features of the A/L ratios again with additional contri-
bution added. We can see that we still have a substantial chance of deficit, but it’s not
as high as before. The median stays flat at about 1.0 all the time. The 95% percentile
remains lower than 1.5 and the 5 percentile doesn’t go below 0.75. By definition, we can
conclude that the pension plan is reasonably well-controlled.
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Figure 2.3: Traditional DB plan results. A/L rates including additional contributions.
1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
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2.4.2 Total Contribution Rates
The Total Contribution rate is the ratio of total contribution to total salaries. We have
plotted quantiles and 30 sample paths in Figure 2.4. We see that the 95% quantile of
the total contribution is relatively high, at about 40%. From the individual paths we can
observe the volatility of total contribution rates is high, which indicates a problem with
sustainability, fairness and efficiency:
• The Tradition DB plan may not be sustainable since the sponsors and active workers
may not be willing to pay such high contributions;
• The plan is also not fair, since some actives pay 40% contribution, and some pay 0%
due to contribution reduction based on market performance, but they are receiving
the same benefits;
• The Traditional DB plan has a problem of inefficiency since contributors are over-
paying in some years followed by underpaying in other years.
Figure 2.4: Traditional DB plan results. Total Contribution rates including additional
contributions(employers and active members each pay 50%). 60% in equities. 1000 pro-
jections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
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Chapter 3
A Hybrid Pension Plan
From the previous chapter we can see the existing problems of the Traditional DB plan: the
volatility of contribution costs is too high, which results in unaffordable total contribution
rates under unfavorable economic conditions. Increasing the equity weighting brings down
the average costs, but increases the contribution volatility. Since the existing pension
structures are not able to meet the criteria of sustainability and fairness, a new hybrid
pension design will be proposed to provide better solutions for existing problems.
We use three key measures for evaluating the characteristics of the pension plan:
• the funding ratio (ratio of assets to liability), indicating the solvency risk which
relates to sustainability and adequacy, efficiency of paying pension benefits and the
risk of paying additional contributions;
• the total contribution rate, representing the affordability and sustainability of the
pension plan;
• the replacement ratio (ratio of benefits to salary), representing the adequacy and
efficiency of the benefits.
A better structured pension design will be worth investigating in consideration from dif-
ferent perspectives. Employers will benefit if they have a lower chance of paying substantial
additional contributions. Active members would like to see the amount of additional con-
tributions reduced, and they also would like to be confident that their own future benefits
are secured. Retirees would like to receive adequate and secure pension benefits.
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The new hybrid pension plan includes two separate accounts: a basis account, which
will fund an accrual rate of 1.2% as a guaranteed base of income to make a living, and
a profit sharing account that tops up the pension income. The following sections will
introduce the design of the basis account and the profit sharing account separately. Then
we will merge the two accounts together and compare it with the traditional DB plan.
3.1 Basis Account
The Basis Account (BA) is invested using a more conservative investment strategy, so that
some proportion of the pension benefit would be secured with little risk. The account is
set up in the following way:
• The assets are assumed to be invested 20% in equities and 80% in long-term risk free
bonds. Hardy et al. (2020) found that the optimal equity weighting for solvency is
around 20% to 30%, so our assumption of 20% seems appropriate;
• The Basis Account pays a 1.2% accrual rate, based on the average of the final five
years’ salary;
• Employers and Employees equally share the Normal Contribution plus 10% of any
deficit from the valuation. If Abf(t) > 1.2V T (t), the 20% of the excess will be re-
leased as a contribution reduction, equally shared between employers and employees,
with a minimum contribution of 0%;
• The valuation interest rate for the Basis Account is the YTM on long-term bonds
with an addition of 15bp, and all other assumptions are the same as the Traditional
DB plan in Chapter 2.
In Figure 3.1, we show the quantiles and sample paths for BA’s A/L ratios. We note
that the BA has the same set up as the traditional DB plan, except for the different asset
weights on equities. We can see that BA has a much better control of surplus and deficit,
compared with the Traditional DB plan, since it has less investment risk. The 95% quan-
tile stays lower than 1.2, indicating that the BA is paying benefits more efficiently. The
5% quantile is important since the basis account guarantees that the retirees are receiving
promised amount of pension benefits, so it should have little risk of default. From the
figure we can see that the down side of the asset-liability rato is better controlled since the
lowest 5% quantile of the asset-liability ratio is higher than 80%.
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the total contribution rates (TCR). Figure 3.2 shows the
quantiles and sample paths for the basis account contribution rates, and in Figure 3.3, we
overlay the quantile plots of the basis account and a traditional DB plan with the same
accrual rate (1.2%) on the same graph. The only difference between the plans is the equity
weighting: 20% for the BA and 60% for the traditional DB.
The contribution rates for the BA are much better controlled. Sustainability relates to
the 95% quantile for TCR (lower is better). We can observe that the BA 95% TCR quantile
is a lot lower than the traditional DB plan’s. However, the BA median contribution rate
is more expensive since it invests less in equity, which will generate less returns. Fairness
relates to the 5% quantile for TCR. The plan is more fair if the 5% quantile TCR is closer
to the median and other quantiles. We can observe that the 5% quantile of the contribution
rate for Traditional DB plan reaches to 0 at most times, but the BA’s 5% TCR quantile is
closer to other quantiles. We can conclude that compared to the traditional DB plan, the
basis account is more sustainable and more fair.
Figure 3.1: Hybrid Plan Basis Account results: Asset/Liability rate. 1000 projections, 5%,
25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths as in Figure 2
The Basis Account in the Hybrid plan will provide about 2/3 of the pension payable
in the Traditional DB plan in Chapter 2. Since we choose a more conservative investment
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Figure 3.2: Hybrid Plan Basis Account results: Total Contribution rate. 1000 projections,
5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths as in Figure 2
Figure 3.3: Hybrid Plan Basis Account (solid) vs Traditional DB plan (dotted line): To-
tal contribution rates. Same accrual rates. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%
quantiles
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strategy, the plan has a much lower risk of default so that we can see it as both affordable
and sustainable. The build-up of Basis Account serves to secure some benefit for retirees.
Next we add a profit sharing account which supplements the guaranteed base pensions
from the BA.
3.2 The Profit Sharing Account
With part of the benefit secured by the basis account, we include a profit sharing (PS)
account to supplement the guaranteed income. The weight on equities is increased to
obtain chances of higher returns. Similar to an IRS plan, both contributions and benefits
are adjusted for surpluses and deficits.
Pension paying with Additional profit
The benefit structure of the profit sharing account is similar to the traditional DB plan
in Chapter 2. It still pays life annuities after retirement, except the payment amount will
be more variable, based on investment returns.
This profit sharing account is built in the following way:
• We invest 80% of assets in equities and 20% in long-term risk free bonds;
• The profit sharing account pays a target of 0.6% accrual rate benefit, based on the
average of the final five years’ salary. This will bring a total of 1.8% accrual rate
when combined with the BA, which equals the accrual rate in the traditional DB
plan in Chapter 2;
• If the plan is in deficit, we assume that 10% of the accrued benefit for the PS plan
will be deducted. For pensions in payment, this is a real deduction. It does not
directly affect the actives in the plan, but does affect the liability value;
• The aggregate total contribution is equal to the Normal Contribution plus 5% of any
deficit from the valuation if the asset-liability ratio is lower than 0.8, which will be
equally shared between employers and employees;
• If Abf(t) > 1.1V T (t), 20% of the excess will be shared in proportion to the liabilities
for each age group in the plan, including both workers and retirees. We removed the
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cap on contribution reduction, which indicates that we allow negative contribution
rates in the profit sharing account, but this is adjusted in a later section.
• The values used – 10% benefit deduction rate, 5% additional contribution rate, and
0.8 A/L threshold – are all illustrative and based on numerical exploration.
Figure 3.4: Hybrid Plan Profit Sharing Account results: Asset/Liability rates. 1000 pro-
jections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths as in Chapter
2
In Figure 3.4, We show the quantiles and the same sample paths for the A/L ratios
of the Profit Sharing account. We can see that the account has funding adequacy since
the median is steady at 1.0 all the time. Even though we allow negative contribution rate
during surplus, the 95% quantile almost reaches 1.4 since we put more weight on asset
in equities. There exists several sample projections generating much higher returns than
Traditional DB plan, but the lowest 5% quantile almost reaches 0.6, which indicates that
the plan is experiencing higher risk at the same time.
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In Figure 3.5(a), we can observe that the total contribution rate plot is more beneficial
for the contributors. The 95% quantile stays lower than 10% since we both cut the pension
payments and add the contributions at a smaller amount when the plan is in deficit, so the
risk of the contribution rate is well-controlled as well. However, since we allow negative
contribution rates when sharing the 20% of surplus, the lowest 5% quantile goes lower than
-5%, and we do have as low as -40% total contribution rate of sample projections when
the assets perform really well. The windfall investment return makes the pension plan
not fair, for example, for the plan members who retire before participating. The negative
contribution rate is also not practical in reality due to the tax implications.
As a result, we add back the constraint of 0% minimum contribution rates. In Figure
3.5(b), we can see that the 95% quantile is still about 10%, and the lowest 5% are floored
at 0%. This avoids the circumstances of paying large amounts of profits when returns are
extremely high.
The profit sharing account serves to supplement the guaranteed income. In next section,
we will merge the profit sharing account with the Basis account as a new Hybrid Pension
plan and compare it with the Traditional DB plan in Section 2.
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(a) TC rate: no constraint
(b) TC rate: 0% minimum constraint
Figure 3.5: Hybrid Plan Profit Sharing Account results: Total Contribution rates (a) no
constraint, and (b) with constraint of 0% minimum contribution rates. 1000 projections,




In this section, we merge the Basis Account and the Profit Sharing Account together as




The asset-liability ratio is important since it represents the solvency and funding adequacy
of the pension plan. In real life, the DB benefits are not secured by current pension
regulation since underfunding is allowed (Davis, 2011). We would like to see the A/L ratio
stay close to 1.0. If the ratio is really low, the plan might default. On the other hand,
having a high A/L ratio means we have collected more assets than we need, which shows
that we are not delivering benefits efficiently.
In Figure 4.1, we show the the quantiles and sample paths for the Hybrid Pension A/L
ratio. We can see that overall the A/L ratio is well-controlled. The median is at about 1.0
as time goes on, and the 95% quantile and 5% quantile stay between 1.4 and 0.8. There
are some individual paths generating really high returns, but the individual paths at most
times fit within the key features, which indicates that the volatility of A/L ratio is not high.
Comparing the quantile plots of Hybrid plan and the Traditional DB plan A/L’s in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we find that the A/L quantiles of the Hybrid Plan are better con-
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trolled than the Traditional DB plan. The 95% quantile of the Hybrid Plan is a lot lower
than the Traditional DB plan. It represents that the hybrid plan is much more efficient in
paying pension benefits. The median of both the hybrid pension plan and the Traditional
DB plan are close to 1.0, which means that both plans are adequately by funded. The
5% quantile of the Hybrid pension plan is slightly higher than Traditional DB plan, which
indicates that the hybrid plan is less risky.
We note that the quantile plot might not be the best way to display the results, since
we merge the A/L of the hybrid plan, as
AbfBasis(t) + AbfProf (t)
V TBasis(t) + V TProf (t)
.
However, the liability in the Basis Account is guaranteed, where the Profit Sharing Ac-
count, we only have a target liability.
To better illustrate this, in Figure 4.3 we show 6 individual paths of A/L rates in the
Basis Account, Profit Sharing Account, hybrid plan, and Traditional DB plan. We observe
that the A/L rates in the BA, displayed by the red solid line, stay close to 1.0 in all 6
graphs. After year 15 in the third graph and the last 5 years of the fourth graph, we can
see that the economic scenarios are unfavorable, so the other two lines go down to 0.4
and 0.6. However, the A/L rates in the BA don’t fall below 0.8. We can conclude that
the volatility of the BA A/L rate is low, which meets the needs of providing guaranteed
benefits. On the other hand, A/L rates in PS account (orange solid lines) are very volatile
due to the large weight on equities. The PS can generate lots of returns in the first and
fifth graphs under favorable economic scenarios, but in the third or the fourth graph, it
will pay no benefits for a while but still collects contributions.
We can observe that the A/L rates of the Traditional DB plan (green slashed lines) and
the Hybrid plan (blue solid lines) have similar shapes, but the hybrid plan’s A/L rates are
less volatile in all cases. Even though the Profit sharing account in Hybrid plan is more
risky than traditional DB plan, we invest only about 1
3
of our assets in the PS account, so
that in total, only around 40% asset are invested in equities in the Hybrid plan, compared
with 60% in the Traditional DB plan. We discuss it further in Section 4.2.1.
By comparing the A/L rates in the Hybrid and traditional DB plans, we conclude that
the splitting between BA and PS in hybrid plan provides a stable guaranteed base payment
that is more secure than the pension benefits in the traditional DB plan.
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Figure 4.1: Hybrid Plan: Asset-Liability rate results. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
Figure 4.2: Traditional DB plan: Asset-Liability rate results. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%,
50%, 75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
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Figure 4.3: A/L rates: Traditional DB plan, Basis Account, Profit Sharing Account, and
hybrid plan. Same Economic Scenarios in each graph
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4.1.2 Total Contribution Rate
The Total Contribution rate is another important measure since it reflects the sustain-
ability and affordability of the pension plan. If the 95% quantile of the total contribution
rate is high, it means that the plan has risk of higher costs. For many companies, the risks
of high contribution costs may dominate those of their own business (Clark and Monk,
2006). It is one of the main reasons that fewer companies are willing to sponsor traditional
DB plan.
In Figure 4.4, we plot the contribution rate quantiles and sample paths of hybrid plan.
We observe that the median of the total contribution rates for the hybrid plan slightly
increase to about 22% at the end. The 95% quantile stays about 30%. The 5% quantile
stays at about 15% for the first 15 years and then decreases.
In Figure 4.5, we compare the total contribution rates of the Hybrid pension plan and
the Traditional DB plan in the same graph. We can observe that both 95% and 75%
quantiles of the Hybrid pension plan are lower than the Traditional DB plan, and more
obviously for the 95%. We can see that the risk of high costs is significantly reduced for
the Hybrid pension plan. However, the median contribution rate of the Hybrid Plan is
higher. This is understandable, since we invest less in equity for the Hybrid plan, which
means that our assets are not able to generate as high return as in the Traditional DB
plan. Comparing the 25% and 5% quantiles, the Hybrid plan shows fewer chances of 0%
contribution rates, which illustrates that the Hybrid pension is more fair than the Tradi-
tional DB plan. Overall, both the Hybrid plan and the Traditional DB plan are affordable,
but the Hybrid pension plan is more expensive, which can be seen as a trade-off of guar-
anteeing some proportion of benefits. The risk of contribution cost is better controlled in
the Hybrid pension plan.
In Figure 4.6, we generate individual paths of the contribution rates for both the Hy-
brid plan and the Traditional DB plan under the same 6 economic scenarios as the A/L
rates in Figure 4.3. We observe that in each scenario, the waves for the Hybrid and the
Traditional DB plans are at the same level and trending in the same direction, but the
contribution rates of the Traditional DB plan are much more volatile than the Hybrid plan.
For example, if we consider we find from Figure 4.3 that the Traditional DB A/L rates
reach to 1.6 at time 5 but fall down below 0.6 at time 30, driving a contribution rate 0%
at time 5 and about 50% at time 30 correspondingly, which is highly inefficient and unfair.
However, since the A/L rate in hybrid plan in the same scenario is much less volatile, the
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contribution rate in hybrid plan stays between 10% and 30% all the time.
The comparison between hybrid plan and traditional DB plan total contribution rates
demonstrates that the hybrid plan is more sustainable and more fair than the traditional
DB plan.
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Figure 4.4: Total Contribution rate - Hybrid plan results. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 95% quantiles, with the same 30 sample paths
Figure 4.5: Total Contribution rate comparison Between Hybrid Plan and Traditional DB
Plan. 1000 projections, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95% quantiles
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Figure 4.6: Total Contribution rates: Traditional DB plan, Hybrid plan. Same Economic
Scenarios in Figure 4.3
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4.1.3 Real income
Considering the pension plan from each individual plan members’ level, we care about the
real income, which represents how much plan members will receive in hand. In Figure 4.7
we show 100 paths of the inflation-adjusted income, for a life who is age 45 at the start of
the projection and stays in the plan till age 75. The real income will be net of 50% of the
contribution rate before retirement; after retirement, the income is the pension benefit. In




hybrid plan, for an active member age 45 at the start of the projections. The following
comments can be made:
• The salary trends upwards due to the use of promotional salary scale, which indicates
that the salaries increase more than inflation each year.
• The variation in salary values between age 46 and 64 come from the differences of the
total contribution rates. The Traditional DB plan’s real income has a larger range
of variation from time 0 to 20 since the total contribution rate is from about 0% to
35%, where the hybrid pension plan’s is from 15% to 30%.
• After retirement, the pension benefit for the Traditional DB plan is highly predictable
if assuming that there is no default, but there are a broad range of variation for hybrid
pension’s benefits. The downside of the benefits are under unfavorable economic
scenarios, where there will be 10% benefit reduction. However, when the investments
perform well, retirees can receive benefits with a replacement rate up to 48% annually.
• With the same accrual rate, there are some chances for the hybrid pension to have a
replacement rate higher than traditional DB plan, but about half of the simulations
generate replacement ratios lower than traditional DB plan.
• In the Hybrid plan, 29.75K of the benefits will be guaranteed annually, which brings
a replacement ratio of 29%, based on 25 years of services; all benefits are guaranteed
in traditional DB plan, unless the plan defaults.
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(a) Real income-Hybrid plan
(b) Real income-Traditional DB plan
Figure 4.7: Projected real income for an active member age 45 at the start of the projec-
tions; Comparison between 4.7(a)Hybrid plan and 4.7(b)Traditional DB plan; same 100
paths
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Figure 4.8: Hybrid Plan: Replacement Ratio at age 65 over 5-year Final Average Salary
at age 64. 1000 simulation projections. The red line indicates the replacement rate of
Traditional DB plan
4.2 Sensitivity Testing
In this section, we adjust some of the illustrative and arbitrary parameters and see how
the changes impact our results. For each test, we perform 1000 simulations and observe
the following measures:
• Probability of A/L lower than 0.65: indicating the plans’ risk of default;
• Median of A/L: indicating the funding adequacy of the plan;
• Probability of Total Contribution rate higher than 35%: representing the
sustainability and fairness of the plan;
• Median of Total Contribution rate: representing the affordability of the plan;
For an active member age 45 at the start of the projection, we present:
• Guaranteed benefit after retirement: representing the amount of money pro-
vided by Basis Account;
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• Average real income at age 50: showing the salary amount net of the contribu-
tions for an active worker;
• Average benefit at age 70: showing the pension benefit amount after retirement.
• Probability of benefits higher than Traditional DB: showing the chances of
receiving higher benefits in hybrid plan
4.2.1 Changing the Accrual Rate and the Equity Weighting
From the previous section, we observe that the median contribution rate in the Hybrid




× 20% + αProf
αBasis + αProf
× 80% = 40%
in equities, which is less than the 60% used in the Traditional DB plan. This makes the
hybrid pension plan more expensive, on average. In this section, with all other assumptions
stay the same, we test two adjustments:
1. The weight on equities for the basis account is increased to 35%;
2. The weight on equities for the basis account is increased to 25.6%; the accrual rates
are changed to 0.01 in the basis account and 0.008 in the profit sharing account.
so that in total we have a 1.8% accrual rate and 50% weight on equities. We compare








α 1.80% 1.2%/0.6% 1.0%/0.8%
Weight on Equities 50% 35%/80% 26%/80%
A/L











P (TCR > 35%) 5.830% [0.74%] 1.540% [0.39%] 2.430% [0.487%]
Median 21.420% [0.68%] 21.200% [0.67%] 21.490%[0.68%]
Income
Guaranteed income 44.6 29.75 24.79
E[income at age 50] 71.79 71.97 72.19
E[income at age 70] 44.6 44.29 44.06
P(age 70’s pension>47) 0 29.50% 24.4%
Table 4.1: Sensitivity Test: impact on solvency, contributions and benefits of Traditional
DB plan, Hybrid plan 1: increasing BA’s equity weight, and Hybrid plan 2: adjusting α
and increasing BA’s equity weight. 1000 projections
We summarize the results in the Table 4.1 and make the following comments:
• The probability of the A/L falling below 0.65 demonstrates that the risk of default
in the Traditional DB plan is much higher than the BA, but lower than the PS. In
Hybrid plan 1, increasing the weight on equities in the BA will slightly increase the
risk of default, but it’s relatively low compared with the Traditional DB plan.
• Compared to the Traditional DB plan, the Hybrid plan is more sustainable and
better at controlling the risk of high costs in all cases since the probability of high
contributions is much smaller than for the Traditional DB plan.
• With the same weight on equities, the affordability of the traditional DB plan and
the Hybrid plan are similar. By comparing Hybrid plan 1 and 2, we observe that
increasing the BA’s accrual rate will increase the total contribution.
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• In Hybrid plan 2, the guaranteed amount is reduced, due to the decrease in the
accrual rate for the basis account. Theoretically all pensions are guaranteed in the
Traditional DB plan, but we don’t take the risk of default into account.
• The average real income increases for active members before retirements since the
contribution rate in the basis account is lower, and more surplus can be shared
from profit sharing account. However, the average pension benefits decreases due to
pension adjustment.
• The average pension benefits in the Hybrid plan after retirement is slightly lower
than in the Traditional DB plan, but there are more chances of receiving a higher
pension than traditional DB plan, and less risk of default.
By comparing Hybrid Plans 1 and 2, with increasing proportion in the profit sharing
account, the real income of active workers increases, but the guaranteed pension decreases,
as does the average pension at age 70. It shows that the profit sharing account appears
more beneficial for younger generations. This will balance out for workers who enter the
plan in their early ages and stay in the plan long enough, but it might not be fair for
those entering the plan late or withdrawing early. In the next section, we will adjust the
illustrative parameters in profit sharing account and observe the results.
4.2.2 Changing parameters in profit sharing accounts
From the sensitivity tests in the previous section, we find that the profit sharing account
favors younger generation, and it may not meet our criteria of fairness. We don’t have
any problem in surplus since it’s shared in proportion to liabilities to each age. However,
in deficit, we deduct 10% of benefits when A/L is lower than 1.0, and we add additional
contributions of 5% of deficits if A/L rate goes lower than 0.8. There are multiple ways to
improve the fairness, including
1. Increasing the amount of additional contribution to 6.6% and decreasing the pension
reduction to 5%;
2. Changing the A/L threshold for both contribution and pension adjustment to 0.9.
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Hybrid Plan 1 Hybrid Plan 2 Hybrid Plan 3
PS Pension
Adjustment
Amount 10.0% 5.0% 10.0%
A/L Threshold 1.00 1.00 0.90
AC in PS
Amount 5.0% 6.67% 5.0%
A/L Threshold 0.8 0.8 0.9
A/L rate
in PS
P (A/L < 0.6) 7.46% [0.83%] 6.41% [0.77%] 7.00% [0.8%]
Median 90.90% 91.58% 92.24%
TC rate
(Hybrid)
P (TCR > 35%) 3.080% [0.54%] 4.48% [0.65%] 1.08% [0.32%]
Median 21.450% 21.452% 21.72%
Income
(Hybrid)
Guaranteed income 29.8 29.8 29.8
E[income at age 50] 72.13 72.03 72.01
E[income at age 70] 43.97 44.45 44.14
P(age 70’s pension>45) 23.00% [1.33%] 26.40% [1.39%] 26.40% [1.39%]
Table 4.2: Sensitivity Testing: Impact on solvency, contributions, and benefits by changing
amount of pension deduction and contribution rate in the PS and A/L rate threshold of
paying. 1000 projections
We summarize the results in Table 4.2 and make the following comments:
• We note that this sensitivity testing only changes the PS account and so does not
impact the A/L rate or the guaranteed income in the BA.
• Both adjustments improve the solvency and funding adequacy. The risk of default
decreases in both cases, and the median A/L rate increases.
• Both increasing the amount of contribution and adjusting the threshold will increase
the total contribution costs. Increasing the amount contributed has larger impact on
sustainability and affordability.
• Adjusting the amount of pension deduction and its additional contribution impacts
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the severity of the changes in income; adjusting the thresholds impact the frequency.
We can observe that both changes can improve fairness, since in both cases, more
contributions are made by active workers and less pensions are deducted for retirees.
However, decreasing the reduction amount will provide more chances of receiving
higher benefits than traditional DB plans, which may be inefficient if benefits become





In this paper, we first modeled a traditional DB pension plan and analyzed the results from
both contributor’s and beneficiary’s perspectives, and then we introduced a new hybrid
pension plan based with similar set up of both traditional DB plan and IRS plan. We
compared the traditional DB plan to the hybrid pension plan and summarize its difference
based the five loose criteria from Hardy et al. (2020): affordability, sustainability, adequacy,
efficiency, and fairness:
• Affordability: We find that the traditional DB plan is affordable based on a 20.3%
median level of total contribution rate. The new hybrid pension plan’s median con-
tribution is about 21.42%, which is 1.12% higher. It’s understandable that the new
hybrid pension plan is more expensive since in the basis account we invest more in
long-term bonds which will generate less return on average, and that will lead to a
higher contribution rate compared to the traditional DB plan. In Chapter 4, sensi-
tivity tests show that the traditional DB plan and Hybrid plan, with identical accrual
rates and equity weighting, bring a similar level of contribution costs. As a result,
both the traditional DB plan and hybrid pension plan can be identified as affordable.
• Sustainability: One disadvantage of the traditional DB plan is that it’s not seen
as sustainable. We can see that the volatility of contribution rate is really high from
Figure 2.4. The hybrid pension plan improves sustainability with a much smaller
volatility of contribution rates as seen in Figure 3.2. The 95% quantile of the total
contribution rate is reduced by about 3% at all times for the new hybrid pension
plan, which is beneficial for both employers and active members.
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• Adequacy: The main advantage of the traditional DB plan is the adequacy and
predictability of pension incomes. However, we did not take into account of the
possibility of default. The new hybrid pension plan pension payments are not as
predictable as traditional DB, however, about 2/3 of the pension is better secured,
since the basis account is much less likely to default. The supplemental payment
from the profit sharing account uses intergenerational risk sharing, which might cause
pension deductions in deficit, but offers a chance of receiving higher income, since we
invest more in equities.
• Efficiency: The investment strategy and payment structure largely improve the
efficiency of the pension plan as well. Since 2/3 of assets are invested in the basis
account, with overall less equity weighting, excessive surpluses can be avoided. The
profit sharing account is structured as risk-sharing. It reduces the chances of paying
too many contributions for excessive pension benefits.
• Fairness: The Hybrid plan improves the fairness by better controlling the volatility
of contributions, but, the downside is the benefits are more volatile. A deficit in basis
account is shared by the contributors, but in the profit-sharing account, the retirees
share the deficit, whereas only contributors share the risk in traditional DB plan. On
the other hand, in the profit sharing account, both contributors and retirees share the
surpluses, which improves fairness. However, considering the perspective of different
age groups, the profit sharing accounts are more favorable younger generations based
on the initiative parameters, but the problem can be reduced, as shown in Chapter
4.
In summary, the hybrid plan can provide a better payment structure than DC plans,
and it can be more efficient and sustainable, through risk-sharing, than both Traditional
DB and DC plans. The hybrid plan design is simple and not costly, and it takes both
contributors’ and beneficiaries’ welfare into account. It provides some flexibility to meet
different needs. For example, the accrual rates and weight on equities can be adjusted
for the both basis account and the profit sharing account to fit the desired balance of
guaranteed pension income, risk tolerance, and cost.
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Table A.1: Membership information
x In force Ave. Salary Ave. service x In force Ave. Salary Ave. service
25 17 32.0 0.5 45 89 66.5 10.04
26 32 33.0 0.97 46 93 68.5 10.36
27 45 35.3 1.45 47 97 70.5 10.69
28 55 36.7 1.92 48 100 72.3 11.01
29 64 38.2 2.39 49 104 74.1 11.35
30 70 39.7 2.89 50 107 76.0 11.80
31 74 41.3 3.39 51 110 77.9 12.24
32 77 42.9 3.88 52 111 79.8 12.78
33 78 44.6 4.38 53 113 81.8 13.31
34 78 46.4 4.94 54 112 83.8 14.06
35 75 48.1 5.58 55 111 85.5 14.93
36 76 49.7 6.18 56 108 87.2 15.93
37 78 51.5 6.75 57 106 89.0 16.93
38 79 53.3 7.29 58 103 90.7 17.93
39 80 55.1 7.80 59 101 92.6 18.93
40 81 57.1 8.29 60 98 94.4 19.93
41 82 59.1 8.75 61 98 96.3 20.93
42 83 60.8 9.09 62 98 97.3 21.93
43 85 62.7 9.41 63 97 98.2 22.93
44 87 64.5 9.73 64 97 99.2 23.93
44










25 0.100246 45 0.03075 65 0.005915 85 0.057665
26 0.100252 46 0.02082 66 0.006619 86 0.064554
27 0.100258 47 0.02090 67 0.007409 87 0.072237
28 0.100266 48 0.02098 68 0.008297 88 0.080798
29 0.100274 49 0.02108 69 0.009294 89 0.090326
30 0.100284 50 0.02118 70 0.010413 90 0.100917
31 0.100295 51 0.02130 71 0.01167 91 0.112675
32 0.100307 52 0.02144 72 0.013081 92 0.125708
33 0.090324 53 0.02159 73 0.014664 93 0.140128
34 0.080343 54 0.02176 74 0.01644 94 0.156052
35 0.070364 55 0.02195 75 0.018433 95 0.173599
36 0.060388 56 0.02217 76 0.020668 96 0.192887
37 0.050415 57 0.02241 77 0.023175 97 0.21403
38 0.05044 58 0.02268 78 0.025984 98 0.237134
39 0.050469 59 0.02299 79 0.029132 99 0.262294
40 0.050501 60 0.01336 80 0.032658 100 0.289584
41 0.050537 61 0.00379 81 0.036607 101 0.319055
42 0.050578 62 0.00423 82 0.041025 102 0.350723
43 0.050623 63 0.00473 83 0.045968 103 0.384564
44 0.040682 64 0.00529 84 0.051493 104 0.4205
For active members, the survival rates are all decrements including death. All active lives
who reach age 65 are assumed to retire immediately. For retirees, death would be the only
decrement.
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